Introduction
Any government has at its disposal two basic methods for financing its expenditures: printing money and imposing taxes. These two broad policy options often have different effects on the macroeconomy. Consequently, assessing the relative costs of alternative forms of government finance is an important issue.
Governments in developing countries frequently rely on inflation taxes to generate a significant portion of their revenue. 1 Moreover, in many developing countries, economic agents conduct at least a portion of their transactions in a currency other than that issued by their domestic government. 2 The ability to use domestic and foreign currencies in variable proportions when making purchases has been coined "currency substitution." Currency substitution allows agents to evade a portion of the domestic government's inflation tax, which erodes the government's inflation-tax base. As a result, currency substitution requires a higher inflation rate to finance a given level of government expenditures with seigniorage. Furthermore, if a country's inflation rate affects its growth rate, currency substitution is certain to play an important role in determining the growth effects of seigniorage-financed government expenditures. How does the presence of currency substitution affect the ranking of income solved for an expression linking the growth rate of the economy to the rate of income taxation, the rate of inflation taxation, and the rate at which foreign currency is substituted for domestic currency. This expression is used to rank analytically and numerically the two government budgetary policies in terms of their effects on the economy's growth rate and inflation rate.
Currency substitution is introduced into the model via a liquidity-in-advance constraint.
The liquidity-in-advance constraint forces agents in the small economy to conduct a portion of their transactions with a mixture of domestic and foreign currencies. Liquidity is required to purchase a domestically-produced good and a foreign-produced good. A fraction of domestic investment expenditures is also included in the liquidity-in-advance constraint. This specification accounts for the fact that many developing countries suffer from limited domestic financial markets, implying that a portion of investment purchases in these economies must be made with cash.
In addition to having access to domestic and foreign currency markets, the small open economy also has access to an international capital market in which it can borrow. International lenders are assumed to charge a country-specific borrowing premium based on the small open economy's debt-capital ratio. This facet of the model captures the fact that developing See Barro (1990) , Rebelo (1991) , and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for examples of studies that investigate the effects of fiscal policy on the growth rate in a closed-economy endogenous growth framework. Kim (1998) provides an analysis of the effects of tax systems (of which inflation is one component) in a closed-economy, endogenous growth model. See Jones and Manuelli (1995) , Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995, 1996) , Ferreira (1999) , and Dotsey and Sarte (2000) for examples of studies that focus on the consequences of monetary policy for the endogenous rate of economic growth in a closed economy. In the literature on open economies, several papers address the effects of either monetary-or fiscal-financing methods. King and Rebelo (1990) and Turnovsky (1996 Turnovsky ( , 1999 are examples of studies that examine the effects of fiscal policy in open-economy, endogenous growth models. Fisher (1999) is an example of an open-economy, endogenous growth model that addresses the relationship between inflation and economic growth. 4 Outside the endogenous growth literature, there exist many studies that analyze the effects of using both monetary and fiscal methods to finance government expenditures. See, for example, Cooley and Hansen (1992) , Turnovsky (1993) , and Bhattacharya, Guzman, Huybens, and Smith (1997) . economies often face constraints on the amount that they can borrow in the international capital market.
The model is used to investigate the relative costs of inflation-tax financed and incometax financed government expenditures. By contrast, most studies that use an endogenous-growth framework to investigate government financing policies concentrate on either monetary or fiscal methods.
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A few studies have combined these two strands of the endogenous growth literature. 4 For instance, De Gregorio (1993) addresses the interaction between inflation, distortionary income taxation, and economic growth in a closed-economy, AK model where households and firms use cash because it reduces the costs of transactions. As another example, van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis (1994) analyze the effects of different modes of government finance on the economic growth rate and the inflation rate in a closed economy model where money enters through agents' utility functions. Palivos and Yip (1995) Barnett and Ho (1998) provide a notable exception. They authors address asset substitution in a two-country, endogenous growth framework. Giovannini and Turtelboom (1992) and Calvo and Végh (1996, 1992) both provide extensive reviews of the very broad theoretical and empirical literature on currency substitution. where inflation acts as a tax because a fraction of investment purchases are subject to a cash-inadvance constraint. Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999) investigate how monetary and fiscal policies affect the economic growth rate and the inflation rate in a closed-economy model where agents have access to financial intermediaries.
Each of these papers that connect the literature on endogenous growth to the literature on alternative government revenue sources uses a closed-economy framework. However, many economies that rely on inflation taxation to generate a substantial portion of their government revenue are small open economies. These economies are more likely to face serious choices about alternative modes of government finance. Thus, the closed-economy nature of this literature is surprising. Moreover, many of the theoretical studies on seigniorage and endogenous growth have ignored the fact that inflation often leads to currency substitution. Where possible, the results of the current paper are compared to those in PY, whose closed-economy model (without currency substitution) is somewhat similar to the model used here. By contrast to the findings in this paper, PY find that inflationary financing hinders economic growth less than income-tax financing. Moreover, the mix of government revenue sources that maximizes the economy's growth rate consists only of inflation taxation. Incometax financing, however, leads to a lower inflation rate than inflation-tax financing.
The analysis reveals that income taxation leads to a higher growth rate and a lower inflation rate than inflation taxation for most parameter values. Moreover, the less developed the small open economy's domestic financial markets, the worse the distortions associated with inflation taxation become. Furthermore, the distortionary tax mix that maximizes the economy's growth rate consists of both income taxation and seigniorage but is skewed heavily toward income taxation due to inflation-tax evasion through currency substitution.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 analyzes the effects of financing government expenditures with income taxes, while Section 4 analyzes the effects of financing government expenditures with inflation taxes. Section 5 compares the consequences of the two budgetary policies for the economic growth rate and the inflation rate.
Section 6 investigates the implications of public spending when both financing policies are available simultaneously to the government. The final section offers conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2.
The Model
2.A. Preliminaries
Imagine a world that consists of many countries. Due to their respective comparative advantages, some countries produce good x, while other countries produce good y. For examples of closed-economy, endogenous growth models with endogenous governmental activities, see Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) where µ is defined as the nominal domestic money-growth rate, m is defined as real domestic currency holdings, and τ is defined as the domestic income-tax rate.
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The representative agent holds both domestic and foreign currencies. As in Calvo and Végh (1994) , currency substitution enters the model through a constraint on liquidity. The liquidity constraint requires that the agent make certain purchases with a combination of domestic and foreign currencies.
The representative agent in the small open economy also has access to an international capital market in which he may borrow to finance purchases of imports. As in Turnovsky (1997) and Osang and Turnovsky (2000) , the small open economy's access to the international capital market is imperfect. Specifically, the cost of international borrowing increases as the country's debt position relative to its capital stock rises.
2.B. The Representative Agent's Problem
In each period, the domestic representative agent faces two constraints: a liquidity constraint and a budget constraint. The liquidity (-in-advance) constraint in nominal terms is 8 11 This definition assumes that the law-of-one price holds.
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Empirical evidence also suggests that countries with lower degrees of financial sophistication tend to have lower rates of economic growth and to experience more negative effects from inflation relative to countries with higher degrees of financial sophistication. See Boyd, Levine, and Smith (1997) and Dotsey and Sarte (2000) .
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Any liquidity aggregator or a liquidity services production function, R(.), must be a linearly homogeneous, twice-continuously differentiable function with the following characteristics:
The Cobb-Douglas liquidity
aggregator in equation (2), has all of these properties. See Calvo
and Végh (1994) . Equation (2) states that consumption purchases and a fraction (φ) of investment purchases must be financed with a combination of domestic and foreign currencies. φ is a measure of the degree of financial sophistication of the economy. Agents in countries with less-developed financial markets may be forced to rely heavily on cash when making transactions in their domestic capital markets, and thus are likely to be characterized by higher values of φ.
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The right-hand side of equation (2) should be interpreted as a liquidity-services production function.
The share of domestic currency in total liquidity is α 0 (0, 1). The specification of the liquidity aggregator indicates that domestic and foreign currencies are imperfect substitutes, implying that there may be legal restrictions on using the foreign currency in the domestic economy or that there may be higher costs associated with transacting in the foreign rather than the domestic currency. 
The budget constraint in nominal terms is:
The stock of international debt held by the domestic representative agent is Z. Z is constrained to be positive and is denominated in foreign currency units. R is the nominal rate of interest that the small open economy faces in the international debt market. This nominal interest rate is given by 
/ q q
The international debt market is distorted. Foreign lenders use the small open economy's debt-capital (debt-equity) ratio to determine the real interest rate (r) at which they are willing to lend. A higher debt-equity ratio leads to a higher real cost of international borrowing, implying that the supply of international debt to the small open economy is upward sloping. In this context, the capital stock serves as a measure of the domestic economy's ability to service its international obligations. A lower capital stock implies greater difficulty in servicing a given stock of debt. Technically, the specification for the small open economy's borrowing cost is where is the debt-capital ratio, z is the real stock of debt in homer z r z (~) (~),
The homogeneous specification of r(.) is required for the existence of a balanced growth path. ξ exhibits the following characteristics: ξN > 0 and ξO > 0. 
the liquidity-in-advance constraint:
and:
Equation (8) 
is as well. To conserve space, the first-order conditions for this problem are presented in Appendix A.
2.C. Solving for the Equilibrium Growth Rate and the Demands for the Two Currencies
To solve for the small open economy's equilibrium growth rate, rewrite equation (A4) grow at rate θ.
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Thus,
Combining equations (A5) and (A8), and recognizing that on the BGP all λs change at the same rate, yields the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule for capital accumulation:
Equation (12) equates the rate of return on consumption of the home-produced good to the marginal cost of borrowing, and can be rewritten as r z
Both the domestic and foreign currency markets must clear in any equilibrium. Domestic money-market clearing requires that and foreign money-market clearing / , m m = − = µ π θ requires that Therefore, while domestic and foreign real balances grow at the / .
* n n = = µ θ same rate, domestic nominal balances grow at a faster rate than foreign nominal balances (µ > µ * ) to cover domestic inflation.
Combining equations (A6), (A9), (10), and (11) and rearranging gives where R = r(.) + π = ρ + θ + π. Equation (13) is an arbitrage condition that equates the cost of international debt to the net return on domestic capital purchased with domestic currency.
Combining equations (A6), (A7), (A9), and (A10) yields an arbitrage condition that equates the cost of international debt to the net return on domestic capital purchased with foreign currency:
Equations (13) and (14) In addition to characterizing the growth rate of the economy, equations (13) and (14) describe the demands for domestic and foreign currencies and the mechanics of currency
substitution. In any equilibrium, the two arbitrage conditions must be equal. Setting equation (13) equal to equation (14) and simplifying yields revealing that the marginal rate of substitution between domestic and foreign currencies equals the ratio of their opportunity costs. According to equation (15), for any positive domestic inflation rate (π > 0), n exceeds m, implying that the marginal productivity of home currency (m)
is higher than that of foreign currency (n). Equation (15) indicates that any increase in the relative opportunity cost of the domestic currency (e.g., an increase in the domestic inflation rate)
causes the representative agent to substitute out of the domestic currency and into the foreign currency. Thus, equation (15) captures currency substitution.
Assuming that the liquidity-in-advance constraint holds with equality, and combining the constraint with equation (15), gives the demands for domestic and foreign currencies:
Equations (16) and (17) Ω Ω
increase in (R / r) reduces the demand for domestic currency and raises the demand for foreign currency.
The Growth Effects of Income Taxes
This section investigates the growth effects of income-tax financed government expenditures. Let θ T denote the growth rate of the small open economy when the government relies solely on income taxes as a source of revenue. To derive the expression for the growth rate under this financing policy, combine equations (13) and (15) and impose the following conditions. First, recognize that when the government derives all of its revenue from income taxation, µ = 0, which implies that g = τx. Second, note that when µ = 0, R = ρ. Third, without loss of generality, assume δ = 0. Thus, the growth rate under income-tax financing is given by:
Equation (18) indicates that there are three factors in the model that alter the rate of economic growth relative to an economy without frictions. First, the existence of a distortionary income tax decreases the net marginal product of capital (the right-hand side of equation (18)), lowering the rate of economic growth. Second, the presence of a liquidity constraint on (the fraction φ of) investment expenditures reduces the rate of return on capital, causing the growth rate to be lower. Finally, the presence of currency substitution moderates the effects of the income-tax distortion and the liquidity-constraint distortion.
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capital, leading to a higher economic growth rate. 
The growth effects of an increase in the size of government, when government expenditures are financed through income taxation, are given by the derivative of θ T with respect
to Ω. A priori, an increase in the size of government financed by an increase in the income-tax rate is expected to reduce the growth rate of the small open economy. Tedious algebra shows that dθ T /dΩ is negative at least when the liquidity aggregator is specified as Cobb-Douglas.
The Growth Effects of Inflation Taxes
This section analyzes the growth effects of an increase in the size of government financed by a higher domestic inflation-tax rate. Let θ M denote the growth rate of the small open economy when the government's only revenue source is seigniorage. In this case, τ = 0, implying that g =
µm.
Recall that Ω = g/x denotes the size of the government. Thus, when the government only has access to inflation taxes, ΩA = µm/k. Also, recognize that R = ρ + µ in the seignioragefinancing case. Therefore, under inflation-tax financing, rewriting equation (13) reveals that θ M is given by:
The domestic money-growth rate (µ) that appears in equation ( 
In equation (20), the presence of currency substitution is captured by H, which indicates how the domestic money-growth rate responds to changes in the opportunity costs of holding the two currencies. H exceeds unity, at least for a Cobb-Douglas liquidity aggregator, implying that the presence of currency substitution raises the domestic money-growth rate required to finance a given level of government expenditures.
The effects of an increase in government expenditures financed by a higher domestic inflation-tax rate are given by the derivative of θ M with respect to Ω. Solving equation (19) for µ, setting the resulting expression equal to (20), taking the total derivative, and manipulating the resulting expression reveals that dθ M /dΩ is impossible to sign unambiguously. Intuitively, an increase in government expenditures financed by inflation taxes has three effects on θ M . First, recognize that an increase in the size of government requires an increase in the domestic moneygrowth rate, which raises the domestic inflation rate and erodes the value of the domestic currency. Abstracting from the fact that agents can substitute between home and foreign currencies, the increase in the domestic money-growth rate causes the liquidity-in-advance constraint to become more restrictive to investment goods. Thus, an increase in the size of government hinders economic growth. Second, the presence of currency substitution permits domestic inflation-tax evasion. Recall that domestic and foreign currencies are imperfect substitutes, implying that the representative agent cannot completely evade the domestic inflation tax by transacting only in the foreign currency. Therefore, ceteris paribus, currency substitution moderates any negative effect of an increase in Ω on θ M . Third, because the representative agent can evade a portion of the inflation tax, the government must implement an even higher moneygrowth rate (relative to a world without currency substitution) in order to finance a given increase in government expenditures. Thus, the liquidity-in-advance constraint is even more restrictive, implying that the negative effect of an increase in Ω on θ M is even larger than previously described. Given the three effects, it is most likely the case that an increase in the size of government under seigniorage financing reduces θ M . The numerical analysis in Section 5 reveals that inflation taxation hinders growth under most of the parameterizations examined.
Note that when investment purchases do not require currency of either type (φ = 0), a change in the domestic money-growth rate does not affect the net marginal product of capital.
Consequently, when φ = 0, an increase in seigniorage-financed government expenditures has no effect on the growth rate of the economy (dθ M /dΩ = 0). Thus, when investment is a credit good, liquidity is superneutral regardless of the ability to engage in currency substitution.
Comparison of the Two Financing Policies
This section investigates the relative costs of the two government financing schemes by employing two different yardsticks for comparison. This section first compares the growth rates θ T to θ M . Then, this section compares the inflation rates that emerge under the different government budgetary policies.
5.A. Comparing the Growth Rates under the Alternative Budgetary Policies
In general, both seigniorage-financed and income-tax-financed government expenditures reduce the growth rate of the small open economy. This subsection investigates which government budgetary policy is more distortionary in terms of hindering economic growth.
When investment is a credit good (φ = 0), the growth effects of the two budgetary policies are compared analytically. When a portion of investment must be purchased with domestic and foreign currencies (0 < φ 1), the growth effects of the two policies are compared numerically.
5.A.1. Investment is a Credit Good
When investment is a credit good (φ =0 
5.A.2. Investment is a Cash Good
When investment is a cash good (0 < φ 1), numerical analysis is used to compare the growth effects of the two government-financing policies. Several steps are involved in conducting the numerical analysis. First, parameter values are assigned. Second, a nonlinear equation solver is applied to equation (18) to generate a value for θ T and to equations (19) and (20) to generate a value for θ M . Finally, the relative costs of the two budgetary policies are compared under alternative assumptions about the parameter values. From the budget constraint, it can be shown that a necessary condition for positive (composite) consumption is that (1-Ω)A > θ M . To facilitate comparison, the same parameter values were chosen as in PY, except for the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ). In the present study σ = 1, whereas in PY, σ = 2. When φ = 0, the numerical value of θ M violates the condition for positive consumption. Parameter values can be chosen to ensure that this condition is met without overturning any of the qualitative results in Table 2 . Choosing alternative values of the parameters would limit comparisons of the rankings of the growth rates between this study and that of PY. that the effects of income taxation on the economic growth rate are stronger than the effects of seigniorage on the economic growth rate.
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As shown in Panel A, when investment expenditures must be financed with cash (of either type), inflation taxation reduces growth more than income taxation, which stands in contrast to the results in PY's closed-economy study. Financing government expenditures with seigniorage distorts growth more when agents can engage in currency substitution to evade the domestic inflation tax. In this case, the domestic money-growth rate required to finance any given size of government must be higher than in a model without currency substitution. This implies that the distortion associated with inflation taxation is stronger in a model with currency substitution than in a model without currency substitution. Moreover, in order to finance a given size of government, inflation-tax evasion causes the growth rate under seigniorage to be less than the growth rate under income taxation.
Panel A of Table 2 also reveals that the difference between the growth rates under the alternative budgetary policies is rather large. For instance, when φ = 2/3, the difference between the growth rates under income-tax financing and seigniorage financing is 0.0125. Furthermore, dθ M /dφ < 0 and dθ T /dφ < 0. As φ increases toward unity, θ M falls more rapidly than does θ T . In fact, θ T is relatively insensitive to increases in φ. Intuitively, as φ increases, the liquidity-in-22 20 As can be seen in Panel B of Table 2 , when α = 0.75 and φ = 1/3, θ M exceeds θ T . The discussion in the text focuses on α declining toward zero. As α rises toward unity, the "currencysubstitution" distortion disappears. Therefore, one should expect inflation taxation to become the superior policy for financing government expenditures in terms of its effects on growth for high enough values of α. That is, the ranking between θ T and θ M should revert to that found in PY as currency substitution becomes less viable. Moreover, as φ declines toward zero, the effects of inflation taxes on growth become smaller. Thus, for high values of α and low values of φ, we should expect θ M to exceed θ T . Sensitivity analysis was used to confirm this intuition. For instance, when α = 0.90 and φ = 1/3, θ M = 0.0389 while θ T = 0.0340. Taken as a whole, Table 2 indicates that, when the government finances its expenditures with seigniorage, the growth rate of the economy is sensitive to the share of domestic currency Intuitively, a reduction in the share of domestic currency in total liquidity decreases the domestic inflation-tax base. Consequently, the government must impose a higher inflationtax rate to raise the same amount of revenue, implying that the growth effects of inflation-tax financing worsen as α declines. In contrast to the results for θ M , The result that θ M falls more rapidly than does θ T reverses at Ω = 0.60. Ω = 0.60 is most likely the maximum size of government given the other parameter values, which may imply that this is a perverse result. As Ω increases beyond 0.60, the growth rates become negative.
Because Ω = 0.60 may be giving a perverse result, the discussion in the text relies on the results when Ω lies between 0.10 and 0.50. numerical values for θ T are relatively insensitive to variations in the share of domestic currency in total liquidity. This suggests that the growth costs of increasing inflation taxes are larger (in absolute value terms) than the growth costs of increasing income taxes. For example, as government expenditures increase from 10 to 20 percent of domestic output, the growth rate under inflation-tax financing falls by 28 percent, whereas the growth rate under income-tax financing falls by 20 percent.
5.B. Comparing the Inflation Rates under the Alternative Budgetary Policies
In addition to comparing the economic growth rates, it is also interesting to rank the inflation rates that occur under the alternative modes of government finance. Let π T denote the domestic inflation rate under income-tax financing, and let π M denote the domestic inflation rate under inflation-tax financing. The generic expression for inflation is given by π = µ -θ. The numerical results reported in Table 2 
Thus, the inflation rate under seigniorage financing is higher than the inflation rate The small open economy could achieve the optimal growth rate by enacting a set of policies that remove the income-tax distortion, the inflation-tax distortion, and the externality associated with the upward-sloping supply of debt. To achieve this optimal growth rate, the government would have to replace the income tax with a lump-sum tax, set the domestic moneygrowth rate according to the Friedman rule, tax transactions in the international debt market, and
A nonlinear equation solver is applied to equations (21) and (22) Table 4 should be emphasized. First, the growth rate of the economy does not have a monotone response to monotonic variations in the tax mix, implying that the nonlinearities inherent in the system are important for the numerical results. Second, when the government derives all of its revenue from domestic inflation taxes (τ = 0, Ω M = 0.35), the lowest growth rate occurs. Starting from this point, any replacement of seigniorage with income taxation leads to a higher growth rate. For example, increasing the fraction of the size of government financed by income taxes from 0 to 0.05 raises the economy's growth rate from 0.0267 to 0.0302. Third, for the tax mixes calculated, the maximum growth rate occurs at τ = 0.25 and Ω M = 0.10. This suggests that the (distorted) growth-maximizing tax mix relies much more heavily on income taxation than on inflation taxation. increasingly distortionary in terms of its effects on growth, because of inflation-tax evasion through currency substitution, as the government relies more heavily on this revenue source.
This result stands in contrast to PY's finding that the growth-maximizing tax mix consists solely of seigniorage.
Conclusions
Using a small open economy, endogenous growth model, this paper analyzes the relative costs of financing government expenditures with domestic income taxes and domestic inflation taxes. In this economy, agents use both domestic and foreign currencies to purchase goods and a portion of the domestic capital stock. Home and foreign currencies are imperfect substitutes for conducting transactions. By substituting between the two currencies, agents can partially evade the domestic inflation tax.
When neither domestic currency nor foreign currency is required to purchase investment goods, income taxation reduces the economy's growth rate more than does inflation taxation.
Income taxes hinder growth more, when investment is a credit good, because liquidity is superneutral.
When liquidity is required to purchase investment goods, inflation taxation is more distortionary than income taxation in terms of its effects on the growth rate of the economy for most of the parameter values considered. As currency substitution permits agents to evade the inflation tax, the government must increase the money-growth rate by more to raise a given amount of revenue than it would in the absence of currency substitution. Consequently, inflation 27 taxation turns out to hinder growth more than income taxation. The more cash is required to purchase capital goods, the worse the negative growth effects associated with inflation taxation become. For a given size of government, the difference in the growth effects of the two policies is quite large numerically. Furthermore, inflation taxation leads to a higher inflation rate than does income taxation in the presence of currency substitution.
When the government has access to both forms of finance simultaneously, the economy achieves its highest growth rate when the government relies on a mix of income taxation and seigniorage. Due to inflation-tax evasion through currency substitution, however, this growthmaximizing mix consists primarily of income taxation. The numerical analysis of the tax mix also reveals that if the only source of government revenue were seigniorage, the government could increase the growth rate of its economy by replacing even a small percentage of its seigniorage revenue with revenue from an income tax.
The analysis in this paper could be extended in several directions. Some governments resort to inflationary finance because the costs associated with collecting, enforcing, and administering inflation taxes can be lower than the costs associated with more conventional taxes. Incorporating these additional aspects of income taxation into the model could alter the ranking of the two government budgetary policies. Another extension could be to examine the effects of capital controls. Some governments have responded to the erosion of their inflationtax base through currency substitution by placing limits on the circulation of foreign currency in the domestic economy. Adding impediments to transacting in the foreign currency to the analysis could also prove interesting. Equilibrium in the small open economy is described by equations (A2-A11), the private budget constraint, the government budget constraint, liquidity-market clearing, a binding liquidity-in-advance constraint, bond-market clearing, and the following transversality conditions:
To ensure the existence of an equilibrium with a positive economic growth rate and bounded lifetime utility, the following parameter restrictions are imposed: A > ρ > 0. The values reported in the table are calculated with A = 0.10, ρ = 0.03, φ = 0.33, and α = 0.50.
When Ω exceeds 60 percent, the growth rates become negative. Thus, the results for Ω > 0.60 are not included.
